Sooo, probably not…

Ultimately, it’s about the cops’ awareness about who has powerful allies and sympathizers capable of giving them trouble, and who can be pushed around without concern. All the trouble with the criminal underclass and rioting is just another consequence of this basic intra-government conflict. (In this sense, it’s a precise analogy for the bungling foreign wars of USG.) Absent this conflict, maintenance of public order is a very easy task.

technology is increating both factors on the left, so the right side will get larger. the future sure is bright, vibrant like a thermonuclear mushroom cloud. will the singularity bail us out in time?

As to whether the Swedish government really could crush the uprising if it were not more convenient to let it continue: I’m not sure. I think “native thugs” are generally more vulnerable to a crackdown, because, in my limited experience, they largely are people with jobs and families, and embedded within a culture that is sympathetic to the state and its ideals. The state is helpless toward the rioters for the same reason it is helpless towards the native criminal underclass, because there is no punishment or harassment it is willing to inflict on them beyond what it is already doing.

(Obviously if the state were suddenly to start challenging Carlyle or Cromer, it could do what it wanted, but that’s beside the point).

Kaus isn’t convincing. One large motivating factor for Muslim and ethnic minority rioting and violence is that this behaviour is encouraged, i.e. this is a means for their communities, and their young men in particular, to acquire prestige and power. When the Cathedral doesn’t want violence and intimidation to be a source of status, it crushes these primitive phenomena—e.g. in the case of native thugs.

Of course, Dalit power is capped by the Brahmin caste’s need to maintain authority. But for the unremarkable individuals who riot and commit terrorist acts, this is both unclear and irrelevant. Humans love whatever power they can get.

The relationship between Islam, as scripture, and violence—i.e. the small amount of truth in the works of Robert Spencer et al—is that Islam, being a religion of belligerence, is most consistent with the Cathedral’s distributed-Machiavellian need for a pet nuisance.

Another motivating factor, I think, is that as a (relatively) genuinely religious people with a unique outside perspective, Muslims recognise the worst excesses of the Cathedral (a.k.a. the Great Satan) and, in their primitive way, perceive their aggressive piety to be the only means of staving off sexual incontinence, brutalist architecture and the whole tacky, infantilised culture of the modern West.